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Logos and Transience
•
1n
Franco Rella

John Paul Russo

Travel along every path, you will
not find the boundaries of the
soul, so deep is its logos.
-Heraclitus, Fr. 71

After World War II the cultural ambience of the Italian Left was
defined variously by dogmatic Marxism, by the later Lukacs, by
socialist realism, and by followers of Croce and Gramsci. In the
1960s the Frankfurt School, French Marxism, and other "critics of
ideology" began to exert a potent influence on Italian criticism. It
was demonstrated (once again) that there could be no ultimate
explanatory language or fact in isolation from its "resistance" or
"opposition," that even the "means of production, in themselves
isolated, do not explain or determine," but are "anticipated, retarded, or crossed by ideological currents." 1 For their own
purposes the Italian critics wished to recover and utilize the
avant-garde, experimental, bourgeois art and literature of modernism: Conrad, Mann, Kafka, Schoenberg, Musil, Rilke, Eliot, Joyce,
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etc. "Modernism" had been condemned as "decadent" and "irrational" by Lukacs on political grounds; it had also been attacked by
the liberal humanist Croce and had remained outside the immediate concerns of Gramsci. During the 1970s and early 1980s the
twin concepts of "negative thought" and the "crisis of reason"
strongly marked the cultural ideology of the Italian Left and entered literary criticism. One can scarcely speak of a unified movement, but it is possible to define a group of concepts, issues,
methodological strategies, and representations that mark out a
"generation." Franco Rella is a leading figure of this generation.

Negative Thought and the Crisis of Reason
In general, "negative thought" stands for the via negativaof the
great modern thinkers and writers and the "twilight of the West"
theme in the aesthetic historians (Burckhardt, Spengler, Schwab).
There is an asserted affinity between "negative thought" and the
sense of "fatuity" (or "frivolity") and "boredom" that was said by
Hegel to characterize the transition between periods, in this case,
between the modern and the postmodern. 2 Negative too is the
relentlessly destructive character of the critique, Nietzsche's
"philosophizing with a hammer." Freud's concepts of repression,
the repetition compulsion, and the death instincts are "negative
thoughts." Methodologically, negative thought bears a family re semblance to the younger (Hegelian) Lukacs and the Frankfurt
School (although one cannot speak of influence - the relationship
is as yet unexplored). In Adorne's negative dialectic, after
the moment of thesis, the second moment is comprised of continuously proliferating antitheses; the third moment, toward
synthesis, is either blocked or indefinitely deferred. "The saving
principle ," writes Adorno on the decline of the individual, "is now
preserved in its antithesis alone." 3 In modernity, so it was said,
there could be no culture-as-synthesis whatsoever, no psychological "wholeness," no "totality" of an "integrated civilization," not
under existing modes of industrialism and the technocratic state. 4
Instead, there is only the continuous flux of the fragmentary, the
precarious, th e transitory, and the unbidden: Montale 's "vestigia l
che il vuoto non ringhiotte" ("vestiges /which the void does not
swallow") ("D ebole sistro"). Finally, the "negative" is the word
unsaid, the thought unheard, the silence in Rilke, Eliot, and
Wittgenstein.
Krisis (1976) is the title of Massimo Cacciari's diagnosis of
fin-de-siecle German and Austrian culture. La crisidellaragioneis a
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collection of essays by various writers which touched off a sustained debate when it appeared in 1979. The "crisis" refers to the
failure of traditional logic and method fully to explicate the problems, modes of inquiry, enigmas, and "solutions" of modern writers and thinkers. 5 This failure synchronized with the collapse of
classical physics at the tum of the century. As Giuseppe Sertoli
comments, classical reason is based on the "mind's self-sufficiency
and autotransparency (Descartes' cogito,Kant's lch denke) ... [it]
silenced the 'language' of the body (the passions, the imagination);
holding a linear and cumulative conception of time, it choked the
voices of those who opposed the 'march of progress.' " 6 The
coherence of the ego and history is purchased at the price of
suppression or relegation to the non-meaningful. Romanticism of
course revalued the non-rational upward, but it retained the epistemological premise and individualist viewpoint of the Enlightenment; instead of expressing ideals of wholeness in terms of reason,
the Romantics chose terms such as imagination, synthesis, and
ideal form. Early modem critics (Babbitt, Eliot, Richards) continued to invoke concepts of humanism, reason, imagination, tradition, synthetic form, synaesthesis, and equilibrium to describe
psychological and cultural synthesis. But the humanist synthesis
was a "fiction of a totality, a simulation of an impossible conciliation; it is even more than an illusion, a trick-in so far as beneath
the harmony of a proper order hides the disorder of reality"; and
formalist criticism turned out to be an even sharper instrument for
detecting textual non-synthesis. 7
Cacciari locates the first signs of "crisis" in the immediate
aftermath of German transcendentalism. The division between
noumenon and phenomenon leads in Schopenhauer to "extreme
pessimism" before the illusory quality of all representation. "The
extraordinary logico-epistemological importance of Schopenhauer
consists in his very deductionof pessimism." 8 Nietzsche's attempt
to overcome the ascesis of Schopenhauer, inherent in his very
logic, precipitates the "negative thought" and crisis. Nietzsche
exposed the "immense plurality and contradictoriness of the real,
irreducible to one meaning or one idea," "irreducible even to the
unity of a theory of consciousness," comments Franco Rella;
Nietzsche "uncovered, within this plurality, the conflictual plurality of the subject" (CF, 13).9 The ego's unity and its knowledge
were displaced by disunity and another, enigmatic "knowledge":
the "reasons of the body," the "reasons of memory and experience" which lie beyond linear time and "classical reason" (SP, 70).
Although Nietzsche retained the category of "the genuine" as an
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ultimate ground of the ego and even equated it with the true, his
"death of God" and displacement of "knowledge" precipitated the
"death of the ego" (SP, 110), what Adorno called the "withering of
the subject." 10
To varying lengths, many Italian critics on the Left subscribe to
the aggiornamentoimplied by negative thought and the crisis of
reason: new forms of thought and imagining, of time and space,
must be analyzed by new forms and methods of inquiry. Of the ten
critics in Crisidellaragione,notes Rella, "at least five either take their
movement from or confront Freud in their readings" (SP, 70). On
their view, classical reason should be supplemented by Freudian
condensation, displacement, the overdetermined, and opposition,
with the "logic of the double," with the "atemporal" and "silen t"
unconscious,
with the free-association
technique of psychoanalysis (CF, 36; CR, 151-53). Freud's concept of the "uncanny," which he employed to investigate E. T. A. Hoffman and
Michelangelo's Moses, brings to light the "contradictory tensions"
that surround every "splitting" and "plurality"; as with his
analysis of the "ultra-clear" no detail in the complex is "too little for
analysis" (CF, 34-35). Wittgenstein also figures importantly in
Cacciari, Rella, and other "negative thought" critics. The
vanishing-point of their picture of modernity is perhaps Wittgenstein's critique of language, his conception of the "unsayable"
forms of reality beyond verbal "limits." His "antimetaphysical
mysticism" 11 led Wittgenstein to take from language - from refer ential language at the very least - the power of revealing, of identifying itself with the "sense of the world" (6.41): "What can be
shown cannotbe said'' (4.1212).12 What cannot be said is exactly the
"sentiment" beyond the limits of the world. Thus, ethics (and
aesthetics) lay beyond "facts" and language-"it is the space of the
mystic and of silence," comments Sertoli:
yet silence is but the reverse of the "great words" of classicalrationality , whose order and law it confirms while declaring, and suffering, its inadequacy. Unable to work through the mourning for the
loss of the past ... silence shows melancholicallythat no language
and reason at variance with the ruling ones can be formulated. 13

"Italy" and Silence
Negative thought and the crisis of reason have been primary
themes in the work of Sertoli (b. 1943), Cacciari (b. 1944), and Rella
(b. 1944). Sertoli, who is an immensely gifted literary critic and
historian of ideas, holds the chair in English Literature and Lan-
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guage at the University of Genoa. One of his earliest papers was on
Richards, Empson, and ambiguity (1967); longer studies include
close readings of Swift, Hardy, Conrad, and Lawrence Durrell; Le
immaginie la realta:saggiosu GastonBachelard;essays on Derrida and
Canguilhem; and introductions to Sterne's Sentimental Journey,
Johnson'sRasselas, Goldsmith's She Stoops To Conquer,and Burke's
Enquiry on the Sublime and the Beautiful. Sertoli acknowledges
"negative thought" and the "crisis of reason" in his work, but his
general superiority as a close reader-he
ranks among the finest
textual critics in Italy-prevents
facile categorization. 14 Cacciari
has a wide reputation as a political philosopher and cultural historian; a major theoretician of the Partito Comunista Italiano, he
served for two sessions in the Italian Parliament (it must be said,
however, that within the Party Cacciari has always been considered somewhat heretical). He is associated with the University of
Venice. Rella, an extremely versatile and prolific critic, teaches in
the Department of History at the Institute of Architecture at Venice. Sertoli and Rella serve on the editorial board of Nuova Corrente
(Cacciari is on the masthead as a contributor), one of the leading
journals in critical theory in Italy. All three critics have been concerned with exploring the foundations of modernity and the postmodern across a wide variety of disciplines.
Cacciari writes mainly within an intellectual context of Central
European thought; Rella draws on the same tradition but also on
French structuralism and, in particular, Foucault; Sertoli has
moved in the ambience of French phenomenology, poststructuralism, and the English novel. There are, curiously enough, few
and always incidental references to Italian writers or thinkers in
their work. The absence of Italian texts marks the fact that Italy-in
spite of Burckhardt's view that she had created the modern
world-played
a relatively minor role in the making· (and the
teaching) of what we call "modernity," namely, the culture that
succeeds the French and industrial revolutions and Kant. Yet in the
writings of these critics, Italy is still the unsaid factor, the buried
soul or, as Rella would say, the "silence." What can be said as one
walks through Italy's cities and towns, her beautiful ruins and
unsurpassed museums, and then confronts "modernity"? An extreme response is Marinetti's Futurist denunciation: "We want to
deliver Italy from its gangrene of professors, archeologists, tourist
guides, and antiquarians. We want to get rid of the innumerable
museums which cover it with cemeteries." 15 The opposite response repeats the historical platitudes and apo logies for classical
humanism. A third takes refuge in a merely antiquarian view of the
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immense, 2500-year-long subject of "Italy."
Neither Rella, Sertoli, nor Cacciari has of course Marinetti's
remedy in mind. Rejecting the pieties of humanism, they do not
choose antiquarianism either. Nonetheless, Italy as historical
exemplar of humanistic culture is in some sense an object of attack,
hidden rhetorically behind a variety of designated targets: the
"classical," "culture," "reason," "humanism," the "universal,"
the unity of the ego, the individual, wholeness, synthesis, etc.
"Italy" was identified so strongly with classical reason and
humanistic education that the silence surrounding its name and
tradition in the periods of crisis (1880-1920, post-1968) is therefore
all the more intriguing. Rella speaks of the "disorder" and "evil" of
the crisis (MA, 10), of the "great 'No' of negative thought which
expresses mournfully the same urgency of eternity as the great
'Yes' of classical culture" (SP, 96). Nietzschean echoes are unmistakable, and yet there is a poignant drama taking place in this
denial of "the great 'Yes' " by a modern Italian in a borrowed
rhetoric .
The "crisis of reason" critics were the first generation to assume positions of authority within the academy after the "crisis" of
1968. At this time Italian universities experienced the first major
shift in their fundamental structure in a half-century. The collapse
of classical reason and concepts of negation, which had been a part
of the cultural climate of northern Europe and America for decades
(where Freudianism had become state religion in its field and
close-reading techniques were a general given in analytical
method), are really signs of the Italian times. The new ideology had
conquered the high ground in certain sectors of the Italian university system, finally displacing traditional humanism. The punishingly insistent rhetoric of crisis and negation was meant if not to
"strike the fathers dead" (for they had long since "died") at least to
rattle their bones.
In particular, Cacciari expresses no nostalgia for the "lost
values" of humanist culture, nor even for "Marxist" humanism, or
other myths of utopia or totality, all versions of "false consciousness." His vision of Worker's Power appropriates the forms,
means, and styles of capitalism and technology, ''l'uso operaio del
capitale," which Sertoli maliciously depicted as "American consumerism in overalls." It is the capitalization of the petty bourgeois
and the complete reverse of Adorno's denunciation of the American way of life. Cacciari in effect rejects the Frankfurt critique of
technocratic reason as a cultural nostalgia. In sum, Cacciari announces antihumanism . While Rella and Sertoli are mandarin in
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their attitude toward Burckhardt's "culture of old Europe" and far
less strident than Cacciari in their critique, they waste little time
fighting rearguard actions with liberal bourgeois humanism. If The
MagicMountain were to be written today, and in Italy, there would
be a hundred Napthas and no Settembrini.

Rella and FreudianCriticism
Two of Rella's major accomplishments are introducing a new
reading of Freud to Italian criticism, and deconstructing Jacques
Lacan. The Freud reading has had a marked influence on Cacciari
and Sertoli. In 1977 Rella edited La criticafreudiana and published
"Testo analitico e analisi testuale" in La materialitadel testo (both
volumes contain essays by Sertoli). In his introduction to La critica
freudianaand his contribution to Crisi dellaragione,Rella took issue
with French and American readings of Freud and exposed inconsistencies
in their concepts of language
and applied
psychoanalysis. Dehistoricized, psychoanalysis was being used as
a "social regulator" and maker of "natural" norms (CR, 165, 170).
Although Rella esteemed Lacan highly as the "last great 'negative'
philosopher" (CR, 166), he criticized him for erecting a new Freudian orthodoxy, announcing the "true" Freud and proposing a
"truth without adjectives ." Such a truth was seen as both "cause
and foundation of a language beyond history (which is the place of
pure manifestation) or culture (which is 'cloacamaxima')" (MA, 15).
Lacan succeeded in "tearing psychoanalysis from the galley-ship
of clinical practice" and in confronting it "with a cognitive and
philosophical problematic." But he ended by restituting Freudian
analysis to the very "philosophical 'compatibility' " (CF, 11) that
Freud had struggled to eschew.
In Rella's analysis, Lacan posits that language precedes the
unconscious, "hides in its folds, to emerge as the language of
being, and to manifest itself in sudden and dazzling epiphanies in
which the subject (of the word, of the Logos) 'happens upon'
truth" (CF, 19). To create "true" science in the present "arid time"
of science, psychoanalysis must "restabilize" the language of
"truth" (CR, 161). Although Freud spoke of the "precariousness"
and plurality of language and knowledge resulting from the "impossibility of basing knowledge on values external to critical practice,'' in Lacan precariousness is the basis of ''another discourse,''
the "discourse of truth." History and society produce the "false,"
the "illusory," the "lacking"; but truth-stable
and singular
Truth-emerges
within the structure of fiction. "From the Other
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the subject receives even the message which it utters." This Other
is the "witness of the Truth." The signifier lies within the "precariousness" of the signified and marks a Truth "which exceeds, in
every case, the real, and which constructs, in this very excess, the
real as a structure of fiction, as an inexorable lack" (CR, 162). As
Lacan describes the action of signifier:
[it] demands another place, the place of the Other, the Other as
witness ... because the Word by which it supports itself can lie,
that is, place itself as truth. Therefore the Truth does not draw its
guarantee from reality, which it concerns, but from elsewhere: from
the Word. 16

The separation between the signifier and signified "frees Lacan
from any nagging thought about a rapport with reality." The
analyst as "master" gains knowledge of the "name" or "word" of
the unconscious, which speaks the "Truth" (CR, 162). Lacan contrasts positivist science with his own "idealist" notion of a "cause
causing every effect," a contrast which for Rella is an entirely too
"simplified" dialectic. From this point, it is but a short step to the
later Lacan (post 1968) whose discourse resembles articles of
"faith" supported by mystical allusions to Augustine, Saint
Theresa, and to a God who "always intervenes." The analyst is a
witness to the "horrible" nature of truth and to an "impossible"
historical reality. Reason resides over a tragic, impotent will, over
the "silence of a reality degraded to refuse and residue" (CR, 167).
Rella objects to Lacan' s hermeneutical idealism and the belief
that there is a truth hidden behind the veils of illusion, a single
voice that speaks. Against Lacan Rella cites Freud to the effect that
the "unconscious speaks more than one dialect" (13. 177). 17 These
dialects speak across and through one another simultaneously,
muffle each other's messages, and cannot be resolved, on any
grounds, into a single language. It is true that Freud argued the
distinction between "historical" and "material" truth (23. 29-30,
267; 22. 191). "Illusions" must be analyzed into their historical
antecedents, and these antecedents themselves must be subjected
to yet another analysis, down to their material origins in a rejected
material reality , in an unremembered past. In other words, there
may be room in Freud for a "material" ultimate that is equivalent to
Lacan's "Truth." However, Rella prefers to focus on Freud's emphasis on the contradictions between the parallel systems or the
contradictions within the systems, on the inherent dualism and
even the conflictual dramain Freud. He is always reminding us that
distortion can occur to and fro along the tortuous route from
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phantasies and illusions to material truths and that the process of
analysis is without limit. According to Rella, the "real simplicity"
behind the "legendary difficulty" of Lacan's work is its attempt to
"show through its own discourse the structural lacks of language,
the very lacks that make necessary the advent of the full word of
Truth" (CR, 163). But, for Rella, psychoanalysis cannot pretend to
"truth"; at best, it attains to "compromise-formations" that uphold
society and culture (MT, 14). Lacan's "return to Freud" is thus
aimed at accomplishing an end opposed to Freud's Unsicherheit
("radical .uncertainty" ) (CF, 20).
Also disputed are the postlacanian studies of Jean-Fran~ois
Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari. Rella argues that the
discourse of the Other, the omnipotence of the signifier, and the
"full word" offers these critics a kind of redemption from the real;
the real is effectively "relegated to the role of a phantom." With
reality and its "knots" suppressed, they can let flow, "undifferentiated and boundless, the productions of the unconscious (desire,
libidinal energies) within a new naturaltotality" (CR, 166). Lyotard
believes that Freudian theory imposes its own static system upon a
body of texts that arose from conditions vastly different from the
circumstances in which the theory was formed. There is neither a
"displacement," "distortion," nor "material difference" between
the representation and the underlying reality, because "representation does not in fact exist." There is but a "single and undifferentiated flux" of desire, the action of the "instinctual apparatus"
(MT, 12).
Rella leans neither toward "closed" Freudian orthodoxies nor
to the dissolution of psychoanalytic methodological potency.
Rather, he interprets Freudian reading as an "open" activity, a
"construction" ("costruzione," one of Rella' s key words), invoking
the power of "refigurability" (CF, 15), like psychoanalytic technique itself. With his unusual ability to rescue an out-of-the-way
text of a master, Rella focuses on Freud's "Constructions in
Analysis" (1937) and "Analysis Terminable and Interminable"
(1937). In these late papers Freud argued for "construction" (or
"reconstruction") over "interpretation" as the "more appropriate"
description for analytic technique. "Interpretation" applies to
something that one does to some single element of the material,
"such as an association." In "construction," however, one proposes a narrative of early history that "has been forgotten from the
traces which it has left behind": "the analyst has neither experienced nor repressed any of the material under consideration: his
task cannot be to remember anything. What then is his task? His
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task is ... to construct it" (23. 261, 259). The analyst puts the
"fragments" into the form of a story: "Up to your nth year you
regarded yourself as the sole and unlimited possessor of your
mother; then came another baby and brought you grave disillusionment. Your mother left you for some time ... " (23. 261).
Obviously interpretation and construction are complementary activities; as Freud says, one must first "discompose" and then
"recompose," but always devoting "micrological" attention to
what is a kind of "microscopic anatomy" (CF, 34).
Rella urges the dual activities of analysis and construction (SP,
42). Analysis discloses the buried "traces," the "tensions," "uncertainties," "contradictions,"
"stratifications," and "conflicts."
Thus, the "shattering" of the classical ordo, beginning with
Nietzsche's "hammer," meant a "dispersion" and "differentiation" of the subject of inquiry. This destruction was the major
achievement of the avant-garde writers and artists, an achievement perfectly articulated by Picasso's "I am the sum of my destructions." But then criticism must "build with the fragments and
historicize them once again" (MF, 104). Construction, the second
act of interpretation, is the making of an "incomplete surrogate"
(CF, 28). One does not "unveil" or "enucleate" one sense, but
elaborates a sense in order to render its "plurality" (CF, 25). At the
interpreter's disposal lie not only ana lytic, dialectic, and Freudian
method, etc., but also the contributions of the modern writers and
thinkers, the figural and mythic methods which have increasingly
supplemented science as models for "rationality." Rella affirms
Freud's comment that the "only safe interpretation ... points to
incompleteness" (23. 263) (Unvollstiindigkeit),and that the degree
of uncertainty is not "assignable" (13. 65) (MT, 13-14). At the same
time one must resist the very attractiveness of "incompleteness"
(CF, 150), which can become fetishized. For Rella, aga in following
Freud, the end of a psychoanalytic procedure is not to erect another
pillar in the "myth" of psychoanalysis, but to perfonn a readingi.e ., the union of theory and practice, "excavation" of the particular
materials down to the smallest details in which the contradictions
manifest themselves.
The relationship between "languages" of analysis and art
becomes one of Rella's central problems. No single language has
"autonomy"; each one is "untranslatable"; they "cut into each
other reciprocally," each "putting its own structure continuously
into play" (MA, 10). The unconscious is not a language for Rella, as
it is for Lacan, but exists in a dialectical relationship to "languages." If critical language confines itself to one technical system
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or even to the broader category of referential language, it inevitably
suppresses through its own ideology the very material it was trying
to unearth. Rella gives the example of Freud's attempt to "translate" the dreams in Wilhelm Jensen's novella Gradiva (1903) into
psychoanalytic language. The experiment ended by "complicating" the literary text "through rewriting it in a contradictory system," which restored "to the text that density which Uensen's]
very naive (or astute?) adherence to nineteenth-century aesthetic
ideology (inspiration, creativity, etc.) had planed away in poetic
form" (CF, 16). Such a critical rewriting in strict psychoanalytic
terms only substitutes its own "truth" (CF, 125) for the author's, an
act which Rodolfe Gasche calls an "excess of mimesis." 18 If languages are like distorting mirrors, revealing here and distending
out of all recognition there, what language is capable of rendering
the truth of art? What method can "guarantee the 'certitude' and
'truth' of literature and the arts," for even Freud said that he must
"lay down arms" before the "reasons" of poetry (CF, 20)? The
quest for a critical language is the first duty of criticism. To the
extent that Rella accepts this challenge and refuses to yield to
irrationalism may reflect not only his profound debt to Freud, but
also to his own humanistic education.

From Concept to Gleichnis
Rella' s proposal for a critical language assumes that contradictions within the text are also "real" and traceable outside it, either
to another text or the psyche or reality where they are subject to
historical determination: the "solution" to critical oppositions, to
"this contradictory constellation dominated by economic contradiction," is the "distortion dominated by the ideology of the
dominant classes" (MT, 17). The critical text initiates a "dialectial
rapport with the original text but is always beyond it, in the sense
that it is not a reconfirmation of it, but underlines it and produces
newness from it" (CF, 194). To this end one must employ a language of multiple functions: descriptive, referential, evaluative . .. and poetic.The subject-object dichotomy must be bridged:
he applauds the "absurd" method of Valery's Mephistofeles which
"allows mixing body and spirit" and "oscillates among diverse
fragments, constructing a possible transit among them without
cancelling the differences" (M, 20). In his poem "Percorsi" (1973)
Rella describes "la ruvida compattezza, incrinando" ("rough compactness, cracking" [NP, 15]). One may compare the sculptor
Arnaldo Pomodoro' s polished bronze spheroids cracked open here
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and there to expose infinitely reticulated and partially disintegrating networks. For Rella, critical language must trace the jagged
contours of the cracks, the breakage, the interstices. In an essay on
Rella's poetry, Sertoli defines the critical act as a "furrow that
excavates the compactness of every given, unlocking the closure
and opening up differences where there had been the appearance
of unity" (NP, 38). 19
For Rella, "completeness" would only impose false unity on
the objects of investigation. To paraphrase Valery on writing a
poem, one does not finish a reading, one only abandons it. Thus
Wittgenstein's "silence" over the impossibility of rewriting Kantian reason is superseded by the "fragments" of his language
games (SP, 23). Benjamin's Passagenwerkremains unfinished after
fifteen years, no formal structure being able to contain its "hieroglyphics," "phantasmagoria,"
"dreams," "ruins" (SP, 149).
Musil' s Man Without Qualitiespossesses "interminability" (Unendlichkeit), a deliberately chosen "losing strategy" (SP, 57, 194).
Nietzsche is quoted to the effect that "facts do not exist; rather only
interpretations" (MA, 53). The "map" of Kafka's world must be
"provisional" and "incomplete" (CF, 192), like an unknown continent with just a few rivers and mountain ranges sketched in. In
Aragon's Le paysan de Paris, "error" unlocks the "doors of mystery"; "confusion" contains the "locks" which "close badly on the
infinite" (MF, 86). The endless Parisian streets represent the form
and theme: frailty, transitoriness, "flanerie" and "prostitution." "I
strive," said Aragon (a hundred years after Blake), "to elevate
myself to the particular" (M, 87). In Max Klinger's Am Strande, the
nude female bather recalls the undulating waters as she stretches
out on the beach, her gaze caught in a "moment of metamorphosis . . . in which nothing seems to have either sense or limit"
(M, 10). Klee's "country without frontier" is the "paradise of appearances" where the destruction of regressive memory becomes
"liberating" (M, 10). As we have said, one of Rella's most fervently
held assumptions is Freud's premise that interpretation and
psychoanalysis are theoretically "interminable" but practically
"terminable" when the "best possible psychological conditions for
the functions of the ego" have been secured (23. 250). Freud interpreted Sandor Ferenczi's paper on terminating analysis as a "warning not to aim at shortening analysis but at deepening it" (23. 247).
Likewise for Rella, interpretation is "interminable" (CF, 50; CR,
171; MA, 53; MT, 13; MF, 103). Logos itself is not a being, but a
"becoming" (CR, 154).
The tension between "completeness" and "incompleteness"
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is never fully resolved in Rella's criticism. This tension exists in
literary texts, in critical methodologies, and is traceable to the
underlying class conflict. Like Lukacs, Rella believes that the working class is the collective subject of the "new totality." But as Sertoli
comments on Il silenzioe le parole,Rella' s "defense resembles the
very mythology that he censures as the 'myth of progress' in
classical (bourgeois) rationality. Moreover, how does such a hope
for a new totality accord with the definition of reason as a conflicting plurality of methods and procedures?" 20
Not least of Rella's strategies is the figural power of metaphor,
narration, and myth; in fact it marks the tendency in Rella' s criticism from Il silenzioe leparoleto Metamorfosi.Nietzsche's Zarathustra
must be accounted an influence in this regard, as well as the later
Wittgenstein ("What I find are new figures" [Gleichnisse][MR, 5]).
Figurability enables the critic to work "rather freely"; the figure is a
movement of "another thought" across the literary image, holding
together the "half-truths"; figures have "maximum abstraction of
concept and maximum force that is defined gradually as myth,
unreason, analogy, image" (MF, 8-9). A figure in Rella is not what
is metamorphosized, neither the tenor, nor the vehicle, but the
"complexity of articulation" of all the terms, the "structuring" of
the ensemble (MF, 134). The "pleasure" of the image is only a stage
which is undercut by the "conflict" of images and (what would
appear) a cathartic "transformation into figures."
A recurrent metaphor in Rella' s poetry is the journey across
the modern metropolis, which initially appears "una grigia esten sione, uniforme" ("a gray extension, uniform," "Percorsi" [NP,
15]), an unusual description for an Italian city, anything but gray
and uniform, except perhaps in a few northern Italian cities in the
dead of winter (Rella' s eye is unfortunately not on the particular in
his poetry as it is in his criticism). Then, in disconnected sequence
come the "murmur," "words," "spaltung" (splitting), "fantasies,"
"traces, houses, trees, steps, sounds, dreams, noises" (NP, 15, 20).
While the catalogue bespeaks the open form of the postmodern,
the walker either has or draws a "map" as he proceeds. He confronts the "fantasma"
of the metropolis, searching amid
tautologies and obfuscations for a "senso preciso" to articulate the
bombardment of impressions and find a "way" ("percorso"), a
"representation." Impressions pile up and, with a suddenness
resembling Rilkean shock, he discovers "this dazzling appearance," this "presence." The preparation (if there is one) for "presence" comes in phrases like "constructing a crossing," "tracing,"
"measuring," acts of critical acumen. Other poems also end on
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gnostic illumination; together they reveal Rella's desire for presence, Platonic light, and origin, as if to circumvent Musil's "the
mystical has set; it cannot withstand the city" (MF, 17).
"PROIEZIONE" (1973) ends with "istante," "future," and
"speranza." In "Hors d(e !)'oeuvre" (beyondthe work) (1974) Rella
wants to quell the terror of "impassioned dreams" and notices the
Petrarchan "light flowering," "your beautiful hair," "so gentle"
("tanto gentile"), symbols of sexual fulfillment. These images of
sudden presence-they
occur near the end of their poems-seem
like a leap of faith. They have their parallel in Rella's criticism with
its contrary notions of fidelity to textual non-synthesis and the
utopian desire for totality.
Like a city, a text lies open to be "crossed," "measured,"
"plumbed" at every cultural and social level. From gray to "dazzling," from uniform to multiform, from absence to presence.
To penetrate these densely-figured designs ("nuclei of maximum
resistance," MF, 105) and to plot their connections with other
designs is the aim of Rella's criticism. Some of his "figures of
construction" are Kafka's hunter Gracco, Baudelaire's "king of a
rainy country," Nietzsche's illness, Rilke's angels, Weininger's
cultural politics, Franz Marc's edenic deer, the andersdenkenand
nontransmissibility of experience into language in Musil, Benjamin's metropolis, and the "silent friend" in Freud (perhaps Rella's
critical tour de force).
Increasingly in his writing Rella attempts to tell a story or
construct a myth by means of the images and abstractions taken
from the text at hand. Myth for Rella, as for Serres, "organizes
... a series of heterogenous images, each of which manifests the
visibility of one aspect of the world" (M, 12). If the first act is critical
(from Gr., critikos, whose Indo-European root means to "cut"), the
second act is th e imaginative reassembling of fragments, which
requires the "hybridizing" of philosophical and literary discourse
and places one structure acrossanother. Thus, images and figures
have more than a stylistic function in critical language. They organize a "construction of diverse cadence" and effect a "redemption" of fragments and images in their isolated senses (MF, 10).
Rella notes that Freudian metaphor is not offered as a "poetic
solution to 'what cannot be said.' "Instead it is a "construction"
involving the possibility of naming that which has been "excluded
by science and classical philosophy: the contradictory plurality of
the real" (MT, 15). To this extent, myth or metaphor substitutes
itself for instrumental reason; or Father substitutes its own
"reasons," to make up for a lack of referential language.
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The blending of "reasons" and styles of procedure had been
practiced by modernist writers who "conducted their work to a
truth which is not purely literary, but rather approximates
philosophical discourse," the "essay" and a "scientific text" (M,
158). Rella instances Freud's construction method of analysis in
Totemand Tabooand the essays on Gradiva,Michelangelo's Moses,
and the Oedipus story, and he notes that Freud had to defend
himself from having written, in his study of Leonardo's childhood
dream, a "psychoanalytic novel" (SP, 103; CF, 21). Most recently,
Rella has studied the narrative method of Plato in the Phaedo,
Symposium,Phaedrusand Republic(BV). The critic thus inhabits an
"intermediate kingdom" (MF, 9, 17) where it is impossible to
distinguish the "literary text," the" essayistic description," and the
"narrative of events" (M, 158). Rella's poetry tends toward the
philosophical; his criticism veers toward the literary. A critic is like
the protagonist of a "novel" and, "rather than moving across real
events and figures, moves across images and figures of thought."
He participates in "strani incontri, strane avventure" ("strange
encounters, strange adventures") (M, 159-60). All the same, writes
Rella, the "novel" remains unfinished. It leaves off on a "perception of a new limit and of a new possibility" (M, 160).
"Metamorphosis" and "battle" are Rella' s latest metaphors for
criticism; his essays are like Ovidian tales of "modernity" or dialectical "disputations." Nothing is fixed; everything is flowing from
one form to another. Logos is subjected to analysis, is dissolved,
and shown in all its partiality, contingency, and transience. Essays
are not close readings of one or two texts, but are organized around
a theme-the dream of reason, the black sun of the mystics, the
end of night, Narcissus-and
include numerous partial readings
and allusions. At some points the interplay of cross-references tires
and bewilders, and one's sense of literary history is scrambled.
The tough-minded analyses in La criticafreudianaand Il silenzioe le
parole(the Weininger effect, Freud's silent friend, Nietzsche, and
Benjamin) work with great intensity through historically resistant
materials. The facts of the case control but do not confine critical
intelligence . This is a formidable criticism that ought to be translated and studied.
Not that Rella is unaware of the dangers of merging the analytic and literary methods. He compares his method to the confluence
of two "seas" of thought, whose point of arrival is only "the
beginning of a new departure, an invitation to a voyage to see new
things which emerge from these and from thosewaters" (M, 161).
Through figure and metamorphosis he will try to render "thinka-
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ble" what was presented historically as "unthinkable," that is, the
"great silence," the "mute vertigo," the "intoxication," the "transgression," the "excess" (MF, 104-5). The variety of sources, the
intellectual sweep and boldness, the driving energy of Rella's
enterprise give life to his new methods. But, again, the humanist
strain is apparent in his refusal to accept any one logos or explanatory method as the complete explanation of "human nature."

Logos/Logoi
With "classical reason" and its associated concept of linear
time one "reads" the world as if it were one's own nature.
"Reason," Aldo Gargani writes, "is like a nature;on one side, as the
nature of thought or more precisely as the 'natural laws of
thought,' and on the other as the objective structure of the world"
(CR, 9). For the negative thinkers, however, the laws of thought
are "regulative" and not "constitutive" of reality. It is an "illusion," writes Wittgenstein, to think that "the so-called laws of
nature are the explanations of natural phenomena" (6.371). Two
examples may serve to contrast "negative" thought with the
"positivist" opposition: Anglo-American empiricism, pragmatism, and "common sense." At the time when Wittgenstein first
went to Cambridge in 1911, any one suffering from Idealism could
apply to Russell and study mathematical logic or repair to G. E.
Moore for the cure of common sense. Wittgenstein's implacable
brilliance drew immediate attention: "he thinks nothing empirical
is knowable," wrote Russell, "I asked him to admit that there was
not a rhinoceros in the room, but he wouldn't," not even after they
"looked under all the desks. " 21 Russell assumed the so-called
correspondence theory of truth whereby the perceptions of the
mind structure themselves in a way that corresponds to reality.
That an empirical proof could be wrong is absurd, non-human,
and therefore monstrous. On the other hand, the Cambridge
Idealist J. M. E. McTaggart thought matter was only a "bare possibility" with nothing to make it preferable to "any other hypothesis
however wild" including belief in "Gorgons" and "Harpies." 22
Here again the non-meaningful is imagined in terms of the monstrous. McTaggart also denied the existence of time, which Moore
"refuted" by common sense: Moore said he was certain that he had
breakfast before lunch. 23
Classical Reason is a broad term: Plato distinguishes nous
("mind," the organizing principle of the universe, wisdom, intuition of the forms, of the Good), dianoia (deductive and
analytic method, dialectical strategies), and dienotes (cleverness,
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"brains"). 24 For Rella and other "negative thought" critics, however, "classical reason" normally means instrumental, technical,
or Enlightenment reason, a highly selective version of Classical
Reason made during the "crisis" of the aristotelian /ptolomaic system in the early seventeenth century. Such a refinement parallels
other narrowings of classical theory with regard to imitation and
form in the High Neoclassic Mode. As Rella notes, while myth
and magic had hitherto kept up relations with geometry and neoplatonism, the Discourse on Method "interrupted the transit
between Mythos and Logos" (M, 15). Instead of phenomena
bounded by "sympathy" throughout the cosmos, they related to
each other by cause and effect in the dimension oflinear time. "The
new science do es not consider knowledge a going back to the past,
a recollection of priscaphilosophia,but a rupture with this past, and
an increase and progress precisely because of this rupture" (M, 25).
New life and "certainty" were given to "classical reason," oddly
enough , by "tearing it from the senses" (MF, 13), that is, from the
body and the body's memory with its idiosyncratic notions of space
and time. The body was a "victim condemned to non-existence"
(M, 15) and denied the right to plead its case.
Rella chooses the "figures" of disease and the destruction of
linear time to pierce through the body's "opacity" (M, 75) and
allow it to articulate its counter-reasons. In The Magic Mountain
Mann depicts fever as "full of contradictions." It renders the subject "more corporeal" or even "exclusively a body" and dissolves
the line between the physical and the spiritual. While the subject
lies immobilized, the heart races and the blood is felt coursing
through tingling veins. At the fever's height, the body is inert, but
images are thrown up from the most distant periods of the subject' s
past. Unlike a dream which normally imposes its formal unity on
material prompted by the previous day, the delirium of fever
knows no limits of time or space; "it hurls fragments inexorably
against each other, in a process of reciprocal extraneity" (M, 74).
Ludovico Settembrini, who symbolizes the "European principle"
or reason, progress, and civilization over against the" Asiatic principle" of "immobility" and "quiescence," warns Hans Castrop that
illness is the very form of depravity, resembling the putrefaction of
death, a "feast" of a new life in which the body is no longer
organized by th e "spirit" with all its "impediments" and "responsibility." The ringing affirmation of Classical Reason, notes Rella, is
"strange" (M, 72) coming from Settembrini who is himself stricken
with fever. It is not strange at all coming from a child of the
Risorgimento.
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Mann draws out the resemblance between the physical manifestation of fever and orgasm, which as the "most acute and
absolute pleasure" should lie at the furthest possible remove from
the anguish of disease. But in both experiences, as Rella comments,
the body dominates-in
disease, with the onset of uncontrolled
physical processes; in orgasm, with the body's "nudity," with its
"weight," with its "opaque thickness" which is "shot through
with an unbearable luminous shudder" (M, 74). The delirium of
fever has affinities to sexual fantasy, particularly to those "fearful
forms of love," the "strange and grief-laden deformations." Both
the physician Hofrat Behrens and the psychiatrist Krakowski reveal "mysteries" to Castrop, the one with his x-rays of the thoracic
cavity that encrypts the diseased tissue; the other with his revelations of love's hidden forms, "relics of abandoned possibility,
ready to take on new life." That we are on the border of the sacred,
between death and life, notes Rella, is apparent from Castrop's
response to seeing his cousin's pulsating heart under the x-ray:
"My God, I see!" "The fever does not limit itself to exhibiting the
body liberated from the spirit, but proposes, in disease as in cure, a
non-human time," which has "neither beginning, nor end" (M,
75). Likewise, when Castrop attempts to communicate with Clavdia Cauchat he finds himself needing to speak French, because
"c' est parlersansparler."As Rella writes, it is the "language" which
allows the repressed to articulate itself; the "language" approximates the silence of the eternal where "one does not speak at all"
(MF, 40).
Rella also shows that in the TractatusWittgenstein locates the
metaphysical ego as a limit of the world, on the edge of silence .
Wittgenstein recoils from the "horror of mixing" (MF, 19) and
severs the psychological from the metaphysical ego: "The
philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human
soul which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the
limit- not a part of the world" (6.641). It is another symptom of the
unresolved dualism, a vestigial Cartesianism with its valorized
cogitoand a perception of the mystical "I."
Under the new logoi, however, "temporal anomalies multiply
themselves" (MF, 57). The "storm of progress" (MF, 22), the "time
of precariousn ess" (SP, 105), the "crisis of reason" in the late
nineteenth century, these conspired to "render perceptible
another kind of temporality" (SP, 76). Nietzsche and Freud undermined classical reason at its point of greatest resistance: its
conception of the historical and individual past as an "unredeemable" thus it was, a chain of "naturally passed events" (SP, 108,
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109). Thus it was is the "boulder which the will cannot move"
because the will "cannot will backwards" (SP, 109). Under these
blocking circumstances, as he describes several times in his works,
Nietzsche discovered his central affirming idea of the eternal return. 25 It is a revolt against Idealism and other-worldliness and
represents an attempt to rivet attention on present existence. Not
just the good will be redeemed, but everything in all its misery and
horror, with one note of hope: that the very idea that this is the only
life, that it will recur over and over again (not of course in the same
precise detail, but in its general character) would lead people to
change. What is to be lived again could thus be different, possibly
better; and so the future is redeemed along with the past. Rella's
most penetrating observations concern the origins of eternal return
in Nietzsche's biography. As Nietzsche characterizes the experience, it possesses many of the features described by Freud in "The
'Uncanny' "(1919). Nietzsche speaks of the suddenness and terror
with which the idea "assailed" or "overtook" him; a howling dog
reminded him of a similar incident in earliest childhood; he felt in
the grip of involuntary memory; the distinction between waking
and dreaming was lost; and silence. The Freudian uncanny is
defined by its displacement of linear time, the demonic, the mixture of the familiar with the strange (or "un-at-home-like," Unheimliche)and the sudden return of some repressed element, which
is ultimately a manifestation of the death instinct. The discovery of
a new time leads to a new logical strategy by which to organize
experience: no longer is "time" to be seen as linearity, the time of
the "bourgeois city," ever fleeting into a past (SP, 109-10). Now
time is redeem able.
Despite Nietzsche's casting of his insight in quasi-mythical
language, Rella interprets eternal return in essentially critical
terms, as a bre ach in the citadel of classical reason. Hence his
disturbance over Lacanian "reason" which ended by being as
"strong" as the "reason" it sought to replace; it established its own
totalizing premises, normative grammar, dominant practice, and
Truth. Rella's deconstruction de-universalized it, permitted it to
become one among a number of "reasons." Typically Rella calls for
"flexible" methods (M, 17), Freud's "witch's reason" (CF, 22) and
"slippery" reason (MF, 17); a "series of satrapies and partial
dominions" (SP, 197); "dispersed," "plural," or "neo-classical"
reason (MA, 17-18); "weak" reason, 26 low-keyed, without imperialist ambitions (CR, 172); "new rationality," that is, a "new
capacity for representing the real" (CS, 9). Adopting the terms of
Deleuze and Guattari, he speaks of "rhizomatic" (MA, 17) opera-
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tions: the humble rhizome is a rootlike horizontal stem lying just
under or just above ground and sending out numerous roots from
its underside and shoots or leaves from its upperside. He likens
reason to "paths" through a "forest of signs"; the paths are "interminable," "exhausting," and full of "conflict" and "struggle";
"the struggle that decides" (CR, 173); the pun on decide (fr. Latin,
decidere,to cut off) allows meanings of determine, resolve, and cut
through. But how much "resolution" can there be in an era that
forbids closure? A rational project for Rella does not consist in
raising plurality to a "metaphysics of difference," in "renouncing
the will to transform reality," or in limiting itself to a "fascination
with the abyss" (MA, 18). In Rella' s crossing the "paths" through a
"scene" in Freud one observes his method in detail . The point at
which he "cuts off" analysis, if not closure in the classical sense,
indicates deeper intentions.

Freud on the "Scene of Transience"
Rella's analysis of the "silent friend" episode in Freud has
major biographical interest, bringing together Freud, Rilke, and
Lou Andreas-Salome. It has close readings of poems, letters, diary
entries, and a Freudian "story" and combines the best elements of
his method-figure,
metamorphosis, displacement and redemption of time (linear, eternal return, constructed), plurality of voices,
and "reasons." His focussed attention on one episode with all its
ramifications seems to have acted as a limiting agent on his
rhetoric. The deep background of the episode is World War I and
its themes are the universal ones of nature, death, and eternity.
Freud himself speaks in this profoundly moral tale, though in the
hushed oblique tone of the modem, with a prophet's authority.
Rella's ingenuity deserves praise because the episode did not lie
ready to hand, or else it would have attracted far more commentary.
In November 1915, on the invitation of the Berliner Goethebund, Freud wrote a brief note Vergi:inglichkeit
("Transience") for a
book of essays Das Land Goethes (1916: "The Land of Goethe"). 27
Containing contributions from prominent German writers, the
book was meant to show that Germany was not the barbarous
country painted by the foreign press. It was the land where Goethe
and fellow poets and thinkers flowered and where the human
spirit was affirmed. Earlier in 1915 Freud had written "Thoughts
for the Times on War and Death" and was under no illusions on
either subject. Rella explains that Freud quietly signals a doubt
about the enterprise of Das Land Goethesin his title, "Transience."
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The brevity of the.note (eight paragraphs) is also a mimesis of its
subject matter.
In "Transience" Freud recalls "a walk through a summer
landscape in -full flower" in the summer before the war (1913) "in
the company of a silent friend and a poet already well-known
despite his young age" (14. 305). 28 The despondent poet finds no
solace in the natural beauty which will vanish by winter. It only
quickens his awareness of the precariousness of all things, the
"sinking into transitoriness" ("Versenkung in die Hinfalligkeit"),
and the ultimate meaninglessness of human values and achievements. No single thing could be truly enjoyed in light of this
knowledge of inevitable loss. Freud countered by speaking up for
the certainty and beauty of nature and humanity. Transience is
"painful" but "true"; it destroys illusions of permanence and to
that extent it has a certain value; but it does not negate the "beauty
and perfection" which have immediate value in our emotional
lives. Transience and "limitations" on the possibility of pleasure
constitute an "increase" of value. Freud makes an analogy to
natural flowering and alludes to Nietzsche's eternal return: "Each
time nature is destroyed by winter it comes again next year, so that
in relation to the length of our lives the return can in fact be
regarded as eternal" (14. 306).29
Freud failed to convince or console his companions and he
began to think of their predicament in terms of "mourning," of
their anticipated grief over nature's death in winter (eventually
these thoughts led to his paper "Mourning and Melancholia"
[1915; pub. 1917]). Turning back to the present but retaining the
nature metaphor, Freud wrote that the War "has devastated the
beauty of the countryside through which it had passed and the
works of art it met with ....
[It] has revealed our instincts in all
their nakedness and let loose the evil spirits within us·which we
thought had been tamed forever by centuries of continuous education by the noblest minds" (14. 307). Nonetheless he felt confident
that sometime after the War "our mourning" would eventually
come to a "spontaneous" end. Then the libido would once again
become "free (in so far as we are still young and active) to replace
lost objects by fresh ones equally or still more precious." Shorn of
the illusion of permanence, we will have learned to value even
more highly the masterworks of civilization. "We will return to
reconstruct everything that the war has destroyed," Freud concluded, "perhaps on a foundation more solid and enduring than
before" (14. 307).
With so many riches elsewhere in the Freud canon scholars
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never gave much attention to "Transience." The standard editors
did not identify the other individuals or the setting, referring only
to Freud's sojourn in San Martino di Cartozza in the Dolomites in
the summer of 1913. Nor did Ernest Jones offer an explanation; he
interpreted the note simply as an "irrefutable denial of the common belief in Freud's supposed pessimism." 30 Then, in 1966, writing in the Psychoanalytic
Quarterly,Herbert Lehmann proposed that
the younger poet was Rilke and that the "silent friend" was Lou
Andreas-Salome. His main and virtually definitive evidence was
Andreas-Salome's Freud Journal (1958) and the comment of her
editor Stanley A. Leavy that she tended "to be silent in Freud's
circle." 31 Max Schur, Freud's doctor in his last decade, accepted
Lehmann's identifications, but attached no particular importance
to them: "Transience" was another illustration of Freud's "basic
love of life and serenity." 32 Rudolph Binion mentions AndreasSalome's introducing Rilke to Freud, but not the connection to
"Transience." 33 In a study of Freud's prose, W. Schonau said that
the note was a "fiction," a "piece of romantic prose" (SP, 77).
For Rella, Freud's countryside in full flower is a "text," a
"figure" which he calls the "scene of transience" (SP, 74). Its
blossoming and decay symbolize Goethe's land in its darkest hour.
The individuals and the historical setting, with the mysterious
clues, must be identified in order to decipher as clearly as possible
the "dischrony," the "unevenness," the "conflict," and the "plurality of dialects of the unconscious" that are speaking across each
other. Indeed, the scene has all the character of a dream in its
precision, its overdeterminedness, its "uncannny" double time
and remembered quality. Rella therefore poses a series of questions: ''What does the affirmation of 'a foundation more solid and
enduring than before' mean in a context in which one affirms that
the negation of transience is only a desire lacking any value in
reality?" "What is the sense of this text, so clear, yet to result in
something so totally hidden in this clarity and therefore incomprehensible ... ?" "Who speaks in this tale?" "Who is silent?"
"What are the words and the silencesaying?" (SP, 78) The solution
to these questions begins with the text but ultimately lies beyond
the "scene of transience," in the other writings of the three persons.
The external evidence may be briefly stated. In her Freud
JournalAndreas-Salome wrote that she introduced Rilke to Freud
at the Fourth International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Munich
in 1913. "They took a liking to one another; so much so that we
remained long together, also in the evening and late into the night.
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The day after the Congress (9 September) with Freud in the courtyard garden" ("Hofgarten") (SP, 83).
The time of year ("summer ... in full flower") is exactly right;
Rilke was relatively young (37) and "already well known." While
"Hofgarten" is not a "summer landscape" ("Sommerlandschaft")
Freud may have chosen the latter geographical term better to evoke
the "land" of Goethe; and besides, as Lehmann notes, "we should
grant Freud some poetic license in setting the mood for his essay. " 34 Moreover, Freud mentioned Rilke in a letter of 9 November
1915 and met with him in either November or December 1915, that
is, during the period of his writing "Transience." Later Freud
wrote Andreas-Salome that "clearly with him one cannot 'conclude an eternal alliance' "(27 July 1916). In Lehmann's view, Rilke
"thus impressed the character of transience on his relationship to
Freud." 35
When Freud met Rilke in Munich in 1913both men were in the
midst of deep personal crises. Jung was proposing major changes
in Freudian theory (e.g., identifying the sexual libido with the
Bergsonian elan vital). Freud had come to the Congress with the
deliberate intention of defending his position. Jung's defection
hurt Freud, not least because he regarded Jung as perhaps his
ablest successor. It is likely the confrontation with Jung came on
the very day that Freud met Rilke. But at this time Freud was also
bringing about what Jones considered one of the two "fundamental" alterations in his theory by way of his studies in narcissism. 36
Moreover, the coming of war and the realization of its meaning for
Western civilization put any personal developments into an
enormous tragic perspective. "I know for certain," he wrote to
Andreas-Salome on 25 November 1915, "that I and my contemporaries will never see a happy time again" (SP, 76). With so many
changes in Freud's life, there were many reasons for him to feel a
sense of "transience" during these months.
Rilke's melancholy was even more grave, because it struck at
the root of his creative power. Work on his Duino Elegieshad come
to a halt after the third Elegy precisely over the question of the
irretrievable flight of things into the "surging abyss." Parts of
others were written but to the wandering Rilke they seemed a
semblance of his own fragmentary life: "my body is become like a
trap" (M, 147). Initially, Rilke had hoped to "construct" new
"reasons" for existence (SP, 83) in the Elegies,reasons based upon
his fleeting perception of permanence, an "angelic order" beyond
change. But in 1913 Rilke was still the poet of flux. "Beauty's
nothing/but beginning of Terror" ["Schrecklichen"], he wrote:
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"Each single angel is terrible./And so I keep down my heart, and
swallow the call-note of depth-dark sobbing" (1. 4-5, 7-9). 37 In
Freud's Beyondthe PleasurePrinciple, 'terror'' or 'fright'' (Schreck)is
distinguished from "fear" (Furcht) and "anxiety" (Angst) by the
element of surprise and unpreparedness for danger (18. 12-13).
Schreckis sufficiently powerful to break the "shield" that protects
the ego from the repressed and is associated with the return of a
repressed episode, a compulsion to repeat, and a manifestation of
the death instinct (18. 31). According to Rella, the angelic perceptions of another order of being come to Rilke as a "shock": "I
should fade ["ich verginge"] in the strength of his /stronger existence" (1. 3-4). The angels "shock" repeatedly ("Every angel is
terrible" ["schrecklich"], 2. 1) and break up the repetition of habit:
1

1

There remains, perhaps
some tree on a slope, to be looked at day after day,
there remains for us yesterday's walk ...
. . . a habit that liked us and stayed and never gave notice.
Elegy 1. 13-16

The angelic experiences shatter the ego's hold on the id's own
coherency and firmness; they precipitate awareness and fear of
death. Can one overcome death? The self is impotent before the
laws of natur e and society. Indeed, before Rilke could surmount
his paralyzing experiences of transience he wa s to fall into deeper
melancholy during the War. He wrot e in Augu st 1915: "the world
has fallen into the hands of men. " 38
Impotenc e and omnipotence, the "uncanny" or doubling, and
narcissism were themes in the writings of both Freud and Rilke in
the period 1912-1915. In Totem and Taboo(1913) and "Narcissism:
An Introduction" Freud redefined his theory of the drives and
proposed an intermediate stage in the development of libidinous
impulses: an infant 's impulses have organized themselves but
have not yet found an external object and so become attached to the
ego; or rather "his egoistic instincts and his libidinous wishes are
not yet separable" (13. 89-90). This is primary narcissism, a residue
of which remain s through life. It is succeeded by what Freud called
"secondary narci ssism": object libido which had been attached to
the mother is returned to the ego. Some of this object-libido eventually finds its way to other objects; if not , the object-libido remains
fixated upon th e ego. Freud believed that some narcissistic fixation
is necessary-it manife sts itself in various forms of self-regard - in
order for the individual to protect himself and allow for a restorative withdrawal in the event of loss (otherwise there may be no
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libidinal projection later on). But the inability to surmount the
phases of narcissism leads to obsessional neuroses: hypochondria,
masturbation, homosexuality, and delusions of grandeur that
mask an underlying helplessness.
Rilke had written the idea of Narcissus into his second Elegy:
he is the figure whose only joy is a memory of lost moments that
strike by surprise and fright: "suddenly, separate mirrors,/drawing
up their own outstreamed beauty into their own faces." The mirror
in Freud is a form of doubling that represents an assurance against
death in primary narcissism; its dream counterpart is "doubling or
multiplication of a genital symbol" as assurance against castration.
"But when this stage has been surmounted, the 'double' reverses
its aspect and instead of an assurance of immortality it becomes the
uncanny harbinger of death" (17. 234). Rilke probably began two
poems on Narcissus in the spring of 1913. One begins "Narziss
verging" ("Narcissus was perishing") and describes his love for
what is being lost, the precarious, up to his own death; as Rella
comments, it recalls the fainting episode in the first Elegy (M, 147).
In the second poem, Narcissus sees the floating image of his double
in the pool, has the narcissist's feeling of megalomania, and at the
same time recognizes his impotence and inability to love: he is
being lured by his double to plunge into the pool and drown:
All my boundaries are in a hurry,
plunge from me and are already yonder . . .
What is reflected there and surely like me,
and trembles upward now in tear -blurred lines,
might perhaps come to being in some woman
inwardly; it was not to be reached .... 39

His desire to have his image live in the generalized "some woman"
may trace to the infant's love for the mother, the first object of love
beyond itself; but this attempt fails. "Narcissus recognizes death
within himself the moment that he loses himself in his gazing
outward," writes Rella, "so that even though he closes himself in a
circle, he cannot save himself from the transience of the world"
(SP, 85).
To review Rella's evidence: there are two historical times, the
summer before the war and the late fall of its grim second year. A
young poet captured by the precariousness of nature opposes a
middle-aged man who accepts it, sees it as heightening the value of
things, and feels the seasonal cycle as a balm to the soul. There are
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also two conceptions of temporality: linear time leading toward
death; and cyclical time, the eternal return around the center of the
self, involving death and rebirth. 40 At this point in his career Rilke
chooses "habit" to stabilize the ego and withstand change, a regressive act in its focus on repetition and refusal of new stimuli.
The choice commits Rilke to "transience" and to "silence." The war
initially seems to confirm Rilke in his position. However, through
its sheer magnitude the war introduces a new category: the "unsayable," the "silence of the indescribable" (SP, 85):
minds of murders
are easily divined. But this, though: death,
the whole of death . . .
this is beyond description! (4. 82-85)
According to Rella, the war is "beyond description" because its
destructiveness has "corroded" the language through which we
"represent and dominate" the world, even the world of transience.
Death represents the unsayable "remainder" ("il resto," what is
left over), proving that our domination is not "perfect." In
"Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," Freud wrote that
death was as "unrepresentable for the primitive savage as it was for
everyone of us today" (14. 293). His whole effort was to construct a
logic to explain this "remainder," outside the boundary of "moral
control": the "immutable law of death." As Max Schur paraphrases Freud, "in recognizing death intellectually man can hope
to overcome not death, but his fear of it." 41

The Silent Friend
Before Rella can present Freud's, Rilke's, and AndreasSalome's separate resolutions of the conflict beyond the "scene of
transience," other voices, the "silent friend," and the land itself
must be allowed to "speak." The first voice is Goethe's; Freud is
writing an essay for "Goethe's Land" and is crossing "the countryside of Goethe," that is, rethinking the dimension of Goethean
"salvation," which is the "solution" of the culture of "classical
reason" (SP, 81). Freud's title "Verganglichkeit" seems to point to
"Alles Vergangliche," from the Chorus Mysticus that concludes

Faust:
Alles Vergangliche
1st nur ein Gleichnis;
Das Unzulangliche,
Hier wird's Ereignis;

All that perishes
is only a figure;
the inadequate
here becomes event;
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the undescribable
here is accomplished;
the eternal feminine
leads us upward. 42

"That transitory things have only symbolic significance," writes
Hans Eichner, was "almost a commonplace in the Age of
Goethe." 43 Faust's world is often raucous and messy, made of evil
temptations, full of dizzying mutability. For Goethe the greatest
experience of mutability was the French Revolution and its
Napoleonic aftermath. Only through self-realization could the individual find salvation and conquer the "anguish of change" (SP,
80). The devil's pact set death and nihilism (staying "fixed" upon
pleasure, self-indulgence, yielding up the self) over against a continuous urge to self-realization. But this ideal of self-realization
required training the self to "desist," to "renounce" the pleasures
of the fleeting moment . The individual must learn that the only
solid thing is the soul's constancy, the "coherence of the ego."
Adorno refers to the Goethean solution as a "dialectic of tact," an
awareness of the "inhumanity of progress," the "threatening impossibility of all human relationships in emergent industrial society." A holdover from the courtesy of Renaissance high culture,
tact ("and humanity-for
him the same thing-") is the "saving
accommodation between alienated human beings." 44
Rella translates Unzulanglicheas "inadequate" instead of the
more common "unattainable" or "inaccessible"; what belongs to
the world of Gleichnis(sign, figur e, comparison) cannot fully express what is beyond it; "here" in the world only an "event" can
express it. For Rella, Goethe's final lines do not mean that the
Eternal Feminine draws upward to heaven, purity, or divine forgiveness; rather, it draws the "subject to itself"; guarantees and
inspires its const ancy; provides an eternal found ation for it; brings
it to the "height " of its value. Faust saved himself by freely renouncing nihilism . His solution is one of the great models of
classical realism (or bourgeois idealism). In a time of catastrophe,
however, the "indescribable" has been "accomplished,"
the
choice has already been made for nihilism. The way across and
"upward" ("ci sublima") over "transience" is no longer "practical"
in the same sense (SP, 80). The fragments will not cohere through
being read as a symbolof another wholeness,through being rescued
"upward in sublimation." Transience cannot be redeemed; it can
only be suppress ed. And not for long: "all my boundaries are in a
hurry." The modern writer must walk through suffering and death
to "find new figures."
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Rella's emphasis on the coherence of the subject refers him
back to the "scene of transience" for a final time and to the one
element in it that remains "silent": the friend. Who is the friend?
Lou Andreas-Salome seems almost overdetermined to fill the role
of the third term and resolve the conflict between Freud and Rilke.
She was the friend in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. For Nietzsche, who proposed to her, she came to symbolize the Eternal Feminine as he indicated at numerous places in
his writings. As the muse of Rilke, she came to think of herself in
terms of the Eternal Feminine and "eternity": in short, Goethe's
way.
For Rilke, what discursive practice leaves unsaid is "Death"
("beyond description"); for Freud, it is the "residue" uncontained
by classical reason. For Andreas-Salome, it is something close to
Goethean eternity. Freud could not have chosen a better epithet for
her than the "silent friend" because silence (a representation of
eternity in her weltanshauung) and friendship were her signature
virtues. "Every desire," she said, "yearns for eternity, for a deep,
deep eternity," "independent of every analytic consideration"
(SP, 88). "Being friends," she wrote in "Thoughts on Lovers'
Problems," meant sharing "reciprocal solitude in order to deepen
it. ... Friendsmeans, then, protector against every losing solitude
in anything whatever -him self included." 45 These virtues of
friendship and silence she brought to perfection; together they
gave her intuitions of pure Being:
The persons of our most remote past, against whom we have
sinned, separating ourselves from them, rise again: no, they are
present as always, marked by eternity-solid
and tranquil; one
thing alone with Being itself. (SP, 89)

In whatever she wrote her fundamental idea shone through. Such
is the case with psychoanalytic language-she was a practicing lay
analyst for many years after 1913- and her theory of narcissism.
Andreas-Salome's theory of narcissism seeks to find a topographical setting within psychoanalysis for what is basically the
Romantic idea of the eternal unity of being. For her, narcissism is
not only a phase of individual development but endures "in all the
subsequent object-cathexes of the libido-which in fact, in Freud's
metaphor, stretches forth pseudopods to objects, like the amoeba,
only to withdraw them when need arises." In keeping with Freud's
conflict between the libido and the instinctual ego energies, but
opposed to his belief in the regressive nature of narcissism,
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Andreas-Salome describes narcissism as facing in two directions,
one toward "self-assertion" and the other toward "abandonment
in the primal boundless state," a "deep identification with the
totality." Libidinal energies in the service of individuation, which
manifests itself in egoism, are responsible for the great tragedies of
mankind. She rejects Freud's later motto "Where id was, there ego
shall be" as going in entirely the wrong direction. It is to the id that
one must repair for value. Friendship, for instance, possesses a
"climate of asexuality, rooted not in mutual eroticism, but a tertium
quid," which is a sublimation of the "most archaic autoeroticism."
Freud's primary narcissism thus becomes responsible for universal
love, "autonomous
judgment,"
the intuitions of "all-encompassing, all-supporting Being." Finally the artist returns to his
primary narcissism when he wishes to discover the truths that he
shareswith his audience, allowing him to be at the same time "fully
personal" and "universal." His labor results in a work which is a
"guide to blessedness," a "rejoicing in the incredible fullness of
union. " 46 The idea is perhaps a restatement of the RousseauisticWordsworthian "sentiment of being," a kind of cosmic consciousness. Freud repudiated similar notions of the "oceanic sensation"
in his discussion of Romain Rolland in Civilizationand Its Discon-

tents.
Andreas-Salome's revisionism was unacceptable to Freud,
who warned her seminar against turning narcissism into a "key to
every possibl e residue." Her theory was a "receptacle for unsolved
residues. " 47 Unsolved-and unresolved, like other dualities in her
work, "spirit/fle sh, ego/sex, active /reactive, objective /subjective,
analysis /synthesi s," her "penchant for ambiguity," her theori es of
bisexuality. 48 Rella ought to have pursued further AndreasSalome's oppositions on the "scene of transience": she was almost
as "burdened with tensions" as Rilke and Freud. But Rella does
show that her "eternity" was finally unacc eptable to Rilke. In The
Notebooksof Malte LauridsBriggehe rejected the "third" term, the
Romantic "eternity" and the "silenc e" which hides a "real conflict":
Was I an imitator and a fool that I needed a third person to tell of the
fate of two human beings who were making things hard for each
other? And I ought to have known that this third person who
pervades all lives and literature s, this gho st of a third per son who
never wa s, ha s no significance and must be disavowed. He is one of
the pretexts of Nature who is always endeavoring to divert the
attention of men from her deepe st secrets. He is the screen behind
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which a drama unfolds. He is the noise at the threshold of the
voiceless silence of a real conflict. 49

Andreas-Salome herself came to recognize the inadequacy of
"silence," not from the War, but from Rilke's death in 1926. Writing to Freud on 20 May 1927 she said that she could not express a
"new experience"which was "unexpected."It derived from "something infinitely sad and linked to the death of Rainer." Does this
show her bondage to transience and the failure of her concept of
narcissism? Somehow she must break her "silence" (SP, 89):
some ten years ago the important thing for me would have been
loss, the abominable despoiling .... Now it is something strange
... to begin with it was an augmented suffering-something
like a
cry-the fact that I could not tell you any more about it .... Now it
is almost as if Rainer were there under my trees, living their autumn
or their summer, their winter and their spring. No absolutely, it is
impossibleto expressit clearly.But after the death of Rainer I am pressed

by the need to speakof it with you.

Freud's memorial note on Andreas-Salome does not mention
this development. She remains the "silent friend" portrayed in
"Transience ." Rella considers Freud's "silence" to be an unresolved conflict in his own position and suggests a distant relation ship to the attitude of women expressed in Weininger's Sex and
Character (1903), where the woman is the "unconscious," "plurality," "heterogeneity," and lack of boundedness (SP, 34). Rella
terms it the "Weininger effect," a resurgent antifeminism operating throughout Middle European culture at the turn of the century
and accounting for the extraordinary popularity of Weininger's
book. Freud writes in the note that Andreas-Salome "never spoke"
of her literary works, but neither does Freud, nor does he mention
her contribution to psychoanalysis. What could be more appropriate than some reference to these works by th e founder of the
subject? Rella underscores the points at issue, beginning with the
curious circumlocution ("It was known ... It was well known")
by which Freud explains how he learned of her past, never allowing her to "sp eak" (although individuals are not normally quoted
in memorial notes about themselves):
It was known that as a girl she had kept up an intense friendship with
Friedrich Nietzsche .... It was well known, too, that many years
later she had acted alike as Muse and protecting mother to Rainer
Mari a Rilke ....
But beyond this her personality remained
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obscure .... She never spokeof her own poetical and literary works.
She clearly knew where the true value in life was to be looked for.
Those who were closer to her had the strongest impression of the
genuineness and harmony of her nature. (23. 298)

Silence and the Eternal Feminine, sustaining one person after
another, govern the passage. Andreas-Salome can only "speak" to
another woman: "My daughter," concludes Freud, "who was her
close friend, once heard her regret that she had not known
psychoanalysis in her youth. But, after all, in those days there was
no such thing" (23. 298-99): the suppression of Andreas-Salome
contains the clue. Freudian psychoanalysis provides the new
"construction" which allows the "silence" of the atemporal (eternal) unconscious to speak.
How did Freud and Rilke cross the "scene of transience"? In
the episode Freud invoked the "eternal return" to rebut his two sad
friends, representing "transience" on the one hand and "silence"
(eternity) on the other. He ended on the note of optimism and
serenity mentioned by his two major biographers. But in subsequent references to "eternal return" Freud gave it a much darker
meaning. It becomes associated with the uncanny, the repetitioncompulsion, and the return of the repressed, that is, regression to
an unresolv ed conflict in one of the phases of narcissism. The
uncanny is experienced as sudden fright, creeping horror, the
revenant, and a blending of the unfamiliar and the familiar; its
dream and literary representations are shadows, doubles, guardian spirits, demons, and second sight. Demonic doubles in stories
are narcissistic images which become terrible under the aspect (or
influence) of repression:
the subject identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in no
doubt as to which his self is, or substitutes the extraneous self for his
own. In other words, there is a doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self. And finally there is the constant recurrence of the
same thing -the repetition of the same features or character-traits
or vicissitudes, of the same crimes, or even the same names through
several consecutive generations. (17. 234)

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1919) Freud associates the "eternal
return" with the sense of the demonic, with being pursued by a
"malignant fate" ("fate neurosis") which is tracking down its
victim and luring it to self-destruction (23. 21-22). Ultimately,
"eternal return" is linked by way of narcissism to the death instinct, which represents the desire to return to a preconscious
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state, and further, to the absence of all disturbing stimuli in inanimate matter. As in narcissism, the eternal return betrays a compulsion to repeat and, arguably, an intolerance of otherness and
difference. In the struggle between the ego and the repressed, the
"patient's resistance arises from his ego," "the compulsion to
repeat must be ascribed to the unconscious repressed" (23. 20).
Rella points out that Freud's descriptions
of repetition
compulsion - "early efflorescence" of infantile sexual life is
"doomed to extinction"-recall
the natural metaphor in "Transience."
How does the analyst treat the repetition-compulsion? Accepting the "eternal return" as the unmistakable given, the "time"
of regression and the denial of linear time, Freud comes to terms
with it by "allowing it to speak" in its own way, that is, through
psychoanalysis. The patient divulges his secret thoughts, tells his
dreams, and engages in free association: he is "obliged to repeat
the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of, as
the physician would prefer to see, remembering it as something
belonging to the past." Gradually there emerges a "transference
neurosis" forced upon the physician. The analyst tries "to keep
this transference neurosis within the narrowest limits: to force as
much as possible into the channel of memory and to allow as little
as possible to emerge as repetition." The patient re-experiences his
past with " some degree of aloofness" and he becomes able to
"recogni ze that what appears to be reality is in fact only a reflection
of a forgotten past." This is the condition for a successful transference and therapy (23. 19). Rella sums up the section of Beyondthe
PleasurePrinciple dealing with "construction": the "present ought
to redeem the past , but as past" (SP, 119), and hence freedom from
repetition.
Linear time lies in the service of the pleasure principle and of
the ego and is a defensive construction to ward off both external
and internal stimuli that disturb consciousness. Some internal
stimuli are inevitably the repetition-compulsions that deny linear
time and manifest themselves as experiences of eternal return.
While Freud had chosen eternal return as consolation in "Transience," at least part of this choice must have been determined by
his personal crisis and unresolved feelings, represented by and in
the "silence" of the uncon scious and the woman, the first object of
affection beyond the self. At this time, too, he must have recognized that in its repetitiveness eternal return resembled the repetitiveness of neurotic symptoms associated with narcissism. Even
the note of hope may express his desire to breakthe cycle:in "Transience" he looks ahead to a time in which one is "free (in so far as
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we are still young and active)" (14. 307). Ultimately it is his own
invention of psychoanalysis that enables Freud to cross the "scene
of transience." "The third way which Freud proposes is that of
recognizing precariousness," writes Rella. Life and death are not
opposed to one another but "make up each other and are articulated by one another, in a different time" (SP, 123). This time is
exactly what the new logos of psychoanalysis can construct.
Rilke's "crossing" beyond transience and the Narcissus period
was not accomplished until February 1922 when he completed his
Elegiesand wrote the Sonnetsto Orpheusin a "sudden" outpouring
of inspiration. The poems contained his resolution: the construction of a new poetic language:
Are we, perhaps, here just for saying: House,
Bridge, Fountain, Gate, Jug, Olive tree, Window, possibly: Pillar, Tower? .... but for saying, remember,
oh, for such saying as never the things themselves
hoped so intensely to be ....
Here is the time for the Tellable, here is its home.
Speak and proclaim.
Elegy 9. 31-35

Rilke's praise of language overcoming time is not the Renaissance
boast of death-defying fame, but the power of language to transform the experience of the transitory into its eternal significance.
Life and death are not diametric opposites, but phases of a single
"profound Being." The human perspective on Being is finite and
limited, but this condition must not be regretted. Rather, it must be
welcomed as the condition for the "fulfillment of our specifically
human task, that of transformation. " 50 As Rilke wrote in the last
year of his life, the poet's task is "to stamp this provisional, perishing earth into ourselves so deeply, so painfully and passionately,
that its being may rise again, 'invisibly,' in us. " 51
Like Freud, Rilke responds obliquely to the final Chorus Mysticus in Faust. The final lines of his tenth and last Elegy read:
And yet, were they waking a likene ss within us, the endlessly dead,
look, they'd be pointing, perhaps, to the catkins, hanging
from empty hazels, or else they'd be meaning the rain
that falls on the dark earth in the early Spring.
And we, who have always thought
of happiness climbing, would
feel the emotion that almost startles
when happiness falls.
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"Endlessly" dead implicates the endlessness of being. The dead
are "waking a likeness," are represented, as in a poem. The revelation that death and life are two sides of being comes through the
imagination. The "endlessly dead" point to the seasonal cycle
rolling on forever, to catkins flowering from dead husks in late
autumn, and to earth made "dark" and poisonous by rain in early
spring (the "dark earth" is an Homeric epithet; earth is darkened
and so nourished by warriors' blood, that is, by death). This
awareness of the unity of being, in nature and art, "almost startles," like the uncanny, with its suddenness, its (cyclical) repetition, its provocation of the instinctual desire to return to inorganic
existence. Almost startles: it does not shock. While the psychological train of events is similar, Rilke now acknowledges "happiness"
or pleasure because the individual is reconciled to-in some sense,
has willed or "constructed"-his
fate. Freud said that the death
instinct wins out because "the aim of all life is death" and that the
satisfaction of this instinct, reducing tension to nothing, gives the
deepest pleasure of all. But the self-preservative (erotic, outgoing,
life-) instincts conspire so that the individual may die only in the
way that is "immanent" within him. He must follow his own "path
to death"; "thus these guardians of life, too, were originally the
myrmidons of death" (18. 38-39). Both climbing on high, Goethe's
way, and equally "falling," the way of the negative modem poet of
transience, may lead to "happiness." One makes-constructsone's death as one makes one's life, in the present moment oflogos
and transience. The tenth Elegy offers Rella a closure on the
grounds of the widest imaginative possibility: present and past,
silence and speech, death and life. "The voices of the past," he
writes, can "speak inside the images of the present. Provided that
we are disposed to this present" (SP, 102).
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